Course Outline

In this course we will discuss Kant's mature theoretical philosophy, i.e. his metaphysics and epistemology. Although Kant would continue to develop and even revise his views until the end of his life, we will be focusing on his views as presented in his most influential work, <u>The Critique of Pure Reason</u> (1781/1787), and in closely related materials. Our goals will be to learn the basic elements of Kantian epistemology, to identify Kant's philosophical objectives, and to evaluate his methodology. Once we have done this we will be able to understand Kant's place in the history of philosophy and the relationship between his philosophy and other great systems or strains of thought: Platonism, Aristotelianism, Continental Rationalism, British Empiricism, Humean Skepticism, and Objectivism.

Day 1

I. Introduction

II. Historical Background

- A. The 17th century's intellectual revolution
- B. The Way of Ideas Consciousness known directly, Reality known indirectly
- C. Rationalism Innate knowledge, concepts, infallible deduction
- D. Empiricism Tabula rasa, sensations (impressions), probable experience

III. Judgments

- A. What is a judgment?
- B. Analytic judgments
- C. Synthetic judgments
- D. A priori v. a posteriori judgments
- E. Analytic a priori v. synthetic a posteriori judgments

IV. Synthetic a priori knowledge

- A. Kant on mathematics
- B. Synthesis in geometry and arithmetic
- C. The core question of the Critique: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?
- D. A clue to the solution: *construction* in geometrical demonstration
- E. The Argument from Geometry

V. The Copernican Revolution

- A. A priori grounds for synthesis
- B. Space and Time as forms of experience
- C. Consciousness as the only object and the only standard of knowledge
- D. The abandonment of the quest for reality
- E. The restriction of knowledge to experience, the limits of representation

VI. Transcendental Idealism

- A. The ideality of Space & Time
- B. The world of experience as mere appearances (phenomena)
- C. Things in themselves as unknowable postulates of thought (noumenal)

Day 2 – Concepts and Method in Transcendental Idealism

I. <u>Recap of Day 1</u>

- A. Synthetic a priori judgments
- B. Space and time as forms of experience
- C. Idealism and the Copernican Revolution
- D. Limits of Representation

II. The Forms of Representation – The Three Faculties

- A. Intuitions of Sensibility
- B. Concepts and Judgments of the Understanding
- C. Ideas of Reason To be considered in day 3

III. The Forms of Representation - Intuitions (Transcendental Aesthetic)

- A. Sensibility
- B. Immediate (vs. mediate) Representations
- C. Receptive (Receptivity v. Spontaneity)
- D. Intellectual Intuition as a god-like ideal, recap of the limits of representation
- E. Space and Time as the *forms* of sensibility or *a priori* intuitions

IV. The Forms of Representation - Concepts and Judgments (Transcendental Analytic)

- A. Intelligibility
- B. Mediate Concepts are of concepts or intuitions
- C. Spontaneous
- D. The Categories as a priori concepts

V. The Categories (Analytic of Concepts)

- A. A priori concepts as the grounds for possible objects of experience
- B. What is "experience" and why does it require "objects"?
- C. Concepts as rules yielding judgments, Categories as yielding forms of judgment
- D. The Table of the Forms of Judgment and the "Metaphysical Deduction"
- E. The Categories and Kant's penchant for patterns

VI. Apperception and the Possibility of Experience (Analytic of Concepts/Principles)

- A. Self-Consciousness, Consciousness, and the "I" of all experiences
- B. The "Transcendental Deduction" of the Categories
- C. Supreme Principles: Non-Contradiction; Transcendental Unity of Apperception
- D. Primacy of Consciousness Consciousness precedes and determines "existence"
- E. Specific Categories deduced from their application in space/time (*schematism*)

VII. The Analogies of Experience (Analytic of Principles)

- A. First Analogy–Substance (Deriving EXISTENCE from temporal experience)
- B. Second Analogy-Causality (Deriving Identity/Causality from the Subject-Object Distinction)
- C. What is right about the analogies? Grounds for the possibility of knowledge
- D. What is wrong about the analogies? Subordination of Existence to Consciousness
- E. Truth in Falsehood

VIII. Transcendental Arguments v. Fundamentality Arguments and Reductions

- A. How does Kant's method differ from "reduction"?
- B. Rand and Aristotle on axioms (Fundamentality v. Transcendental Arguments)
- C. Kant v. Rand on first grasping the self/world distinction
- D. Primacy of Existence v. Consciousness in Method
- E. Relations between Metaphysics and Epistemology -Genealogical Epistemology

Day 3

- I. <u>Recap of previous Day</u>
 - A. The faculties of sensibility and understanding
 - B. Intuitions and the *a priori* intuitions of Space and Time
 - C. Concepts and the Categories
 - D. The Unity of Apperception, Consciousness as knowing consciousness
- II. <u>Unfinished Material from Day 2</u>

III. Reason and Pure Reason

- A. Ideas as the representations of reason
- B. Ideas as lacking *a priori* form and as being merely thinkable
- C. Transcendental Illusion and Pure Reason's tendency to overstep its bounds
- D. The rejection of metaphysical dogmatism in the Transcendental Dialectic
- E. The Ideas of Reason as *Regulative Ideals* prescribed by Practical Reason
- F. Denying Knowledge and Making room for Faith

IV. The Pathology of Idealism - Plato and Kant

- A. How did we get here?
- B. "Plato's Problem"
- C. Conceptual knowledge without perceptual order
- D. Transcendental Forms: Platonism (Ontological) and Kantianism (Psychological)
- E. How "objective" are the Forms? How "psychological" are the Categories?
- F. The Rise of Absolute Idealism; Dualistic v. Monistic Idealism (Noeticism)

V. Kantianism as the "Black Mirror" of Objectivism - Kant and Philosophical Trichotomies

- A. Introduction to Trichotomies (non-sacrifice, self-sacrifice, other-sacrifice)
- B. The two false options as *orientations*; neither is even half-right
- C. Synthesis of the false alternatives; the essentialized antipode of the truth
- D. Objectivism, Intrinsicism, Subjectivism, and Kantianism
- E. Aristotelianism, Mysticism, Skepticism, and Kantianism
- F. Aristotelianism/Objectivism, Rationalism, Empiricism, and Kantianism
- G. Objective integration, Misintegration, Non-integration, Pseudo-integration

VI. Final Thoughts and a Look Ahead

- A. Kant as combining the worst elements of mystical and skeptical traditions
- B. Kant's one point of Pure Mysticism: Freedom and the Categorical Imperative
- C. Kant's Influence on subsequent philosophy
- D. A look ahead to Part II: Kant's Practical Philosophy

Tables of Categories

Forms of Judgment

1. Quantity of Judgments

Universal – All S is P Particular – Some S is P Singular – This S is P

2. Quality

Affirmative - S is P Negative – S is not P Infinite - S is non-P

3. Relation

Categorical - S is P Hypothetical – If P then Q Disjunctive – P or Q

4. Modality

Problematic – S could be P Assertoric – S is P Apodictic – S must be P

Table of Categories

1. Of Quantity Unity Plurality Totality

3. Of Relation

Of Inherence and Subsistence (*substantia et accidens*) Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect) Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)

4. Of Modality

Possibility – Impossibility Existence – Non-Existence Necessity-Contingency

Principles of Pure Understanding

Mathematical

1. Axioms of intuition

2. Anticipations of perception

4. Postulates of empirical thinking in general

3. Analogies of experience

Dynamical

Objectivist Summer Conference 2007 Jason G. Rheins

2. Of Quality Reality Negation Limitation

Table of Categories

1. Of Quantity Unity Plurality Totality

3. Of Relation

Of Inherence and Subsistence (*substantia et accidens*) Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect) Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)

4. Of Modality

Possibility – Impossibility Existence – Non-Existence Necessity-Contingency

Schemata of the Categories

1. Schema of Magnitude(s) *Time Series* [The generation (synthesis) of time itself] Number

2. Filled/Empty Time Content of Time
[Synthesis of sensation w/ time - filling time] A being (in time) –time filled (with a sensation) A non-being (in time) – empty time Continuous transition from filled to empty time **3.** *Order of time* [Temporal Interrelations of perceptions] Persistent Substance (Substratum) Lawful succession Simultaneity of determinations

4.

Sum total of Time

[Time as the correlate of the determination of whether and how an object belongs to time] Agreement of synthesis with conditions of time – (no simultaneous contradictions) Actuality – Existence at a determinate time Existence of an object at all times

2. Of Quality Reality Negation Limitation

Philosophical Trichotomies and "Black Mirrors"

Our basic scheme is a trichotomy with the right position "between" the two wrong "extremes".





Q: With respect to the Categories, is Kant an Intrinsicist or a Subjectivist? A: Both



No Black Mirror can exist if the secondary distinction is exclusive (i.e. strictly P and not-P).





Basic Points and Terms (your Kant I cheat-sheet)

Types of Judgments

Judgment (*Urteil*)– A judgment is the determination of a subject with a predicate concept. ["Judgment" can also refer to the faculty or power to make judgments, in which case Kant uses the term "*Urteilskraft*" or "power of judgment"].

For instance, "Man is mortal", where the concept |man| is given determination by the concept |mortal|. In other words, you are identifying that men are mortal by subsuming them under mortality's concept. However, Kant does not view judgment as merely an act of conceptual identification. "Determination" also has the sense of **giving determinate identity to the subject**. If we could not judge that Socrates is a man, that is if we could not apply the concept |man| to Socrates, then he would not appear to us in experience as a man. Kant believes that this is the case with respect to both empirical and *a priori* concepts.

Analytic (*analytisch*) **Judgment** – An analytic judgment is one in which the predicate is already contained in the concept of the subject. Therefore, it can be known to be true by merely analyzing the content of the subject concept. Hume called these "**relations of ideas**".

For instance, "Man is an animal" is an analytic judgment since the concept |man| already contains in it the concept |animal|. The definition of |Man| is "the rational animal", so both the concepts |animal| and |rational| must be contained within in it. All analytic judgments are *a priori*, and the supreme principle governing them (i.e. the principle in virtue of which they all must be true, *a priori*) is the principle of non-contradiction.

Synthetic (*synthetisch*) **Judgment** – A synthetic judgment is one in which the predicate is ampliative [*adds something*] with respect to the subject. Hume called these "**matters of fact**".

For instance, while "All bachelors are unmarried", is analytic, "Old bachelors are pitiable" is a synthetic judgment because the determination that old bachelors are pitiable is not already contained in their concept. Something additional (an intuition) must be given in order that the predicate be synthesized [*put together with*] with the subject.

Kant also regards mathematical statements such as "2+3=5" to be synthetic. Why? Well, even if we express this equation in a form that makes it look the most like an identity statement (and remember, identity statements are analytic):

(1+1) + (1+1+1) = (1+1+1+1+1)

it is still the case that we must be able to hold in mind the first item (1+1), see that it is of common units with (1+1+1), unite them, and then see that (1+1+1+1+1) are also in common units and that their number is the same as the prior sum. All of these additional

acts of synthesis are necessary to establish the truth of the equation. However, this information is not contained in the concepts |2|, |3|, |5|, |+|, or |=|. In other words, there is no one concept in the equation (such as |5|) that you are finding all of the other concepts in. Rather you are sticking together concepts to get something new.

A priori – A judgment is *a priori* if its truth is not determined empirically. We may need experience to form it, but experience is not its basis or grounds. A concept or intuition is *a priori* if it exists prior to experience rather than being formed in or from experience.

For instance, "2+3=5" is (claimed to be) an *a priori* judgment because its truth is not established empirically. That is to say that you do not determine whether "2+3=5" is true by repeatedly going out into the world, taking two things and adding them to three other things, and observing whether or not at the end you tend to have five things.

A posteriori / Empirical (empirisch) – A judgment is empirical or known *a posteriori* if its truth is determined through experience. Likewise a concept or an intuition is *a posteriori* if it is formed from or in experience, respectively.

For instance, "Giraffes have black tongues" or "The Empire State Building is 1,472 ft. high" are determined to be true through experience – we observe giraffes' tongues or we go up and measure the empire state building. Likewise, the concept |giraffe| is empirical because it is only through our experience of such creatures that we form a concept for them. Kant's account of empirical concepts is relatively undeveloped, though he makes statements wherein he seems to endorse Locke's theory (although only for *empirical* concepts).

Synthetic *a priori* – A synthetic judgment is true *a priori* if its synthesis is given prior to experience by an inherent faculty of the mind. All mathematics is synthetic yet known *a priori*, and it can be known because we have *a priori* intuitions in which to construct and unite mathematical concepts. The central question of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is: How are synthetic judgments possible *a priori*? The supreme principle of synthetic *a priori* judgments (i.e. the principle in virtue of which they all must be true, *a priori*) is the **Unity of Apperception** or the possibility of objective experience.

Transcendental Idealism

Transcendental Idealism – The doctrine that experience is of **phenomena**, not things in themselves, and that space and time are merely the forms of experience. In **transcendental idealism**, we can claim to know with certainty various systematic facts about *experience* because the mind structures experience in certain definite ways. The mind can structure experience – which is of appearances – not things in themselves, hence transcendental idealism concerns itself with the phenomenal, not the **noumenal**, i.e. things in themselves.

The Copernican Revolution – Kant's term for the shift from Transcendental Realism (that we can know things in themselves and that the mind must conform to experience) to Transcendental Idealism where experience must now conform to the *a priori* demands of consciousness

(*bewußtsein*). In other words, it is the shift to full primacy of consciousness. He called this a Copernican revolution because in the actual Copernican revolution's shift to the heliocentric model, celestial *phenomena* came to be understood as appearing the way that they do because of the *position of the observer* on a moving planet (namely, the Earth).

Empirical Idealism – The doctrine, rejected by Kant, that outer sense must be demonstrated as valid from inner sense. Kant thinks this is a mistake that is due to confusing outer sense for things-in-themselves. Kant's position, "**Empirical** Realism" is that inner and outer sense are both simply appearances. If anything, inner sense, in order to be organized, must rely first on a unified object in outer sense.

Phenomena/Noumena – The distinction between things in appearance, which is how they are experienced and understood by us, and things in themselves, which are never experienced or understood but can only be "thought" of. However, when it comes to understanding ourselves as thinking beings with free will, Kant says that we think of ourselves as noumenal.

Faculties and forms of Representation

Sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) – One of the two forms of representation (*Vorstellung*) which humans have and which is a component of any cognition (*Erkenntnis*, *cognitio*). The representations that the faculty of sensibility gives us are **intuitions** (*Anschauungen*).

Understanding (*Vorstand*) – One of the two forms of representation (*Vorstellung*) which humans have and which is a component of any cognition (*Erkenntnis, cognitio*). The representation that the faculty of the understanding gives to us is the **concept** (*Begriff*). In later works such as the third Critique, Kant uses "understanding" to mean everything that theoretical reason can know.

Intuition (*Anschauung*) – An intuition is an immediate representation of an object, meaning it is not mediated through any other representation. All of our (human) intuitions are sensible, meaning that they come from sense perception, and thus they do not reveal to us things in themselves, but rather our affectations. Moreover, they are the result of **receptivity** meaning they come to us, or with respect to them we are passive. (One can think about -not understand- the idea of *intellectual intuition* as god might have, where one immediately knows an object simply by thinking it. This would only work for someone like god, who by the very act of thinking of x can bring x into existence. It would only be in this way anyone could ever know things in themselves). **Space** and **Time** are *a priori* intuitions, meaning that they are the form in which all other intuitions are given. They are not given in experience; they are the form that experience takes.

Concept (*Begriff*) – A concept is a mediate, universal representation. It is universal in the sense that it refers to all such things; i.e. the concept |tree| means *all* things which are trees, i.e. all trees. A concept is mediate because all concepts represent **intuitions** universally – that is to say that they unite intuitions, and some concepts are mediated through prior concepts. Concepts are intellectual, rather than the sensible; they are formed through the understanding through **spontaneity**. This means that we make them and that with respect to them we are active.

Idea – An idea is a *systematic representation of concepts* which is formed by the faculty of **reason**. Ideas can be thought but not understood – i.e. they do not determine experience the way concepts do. However, they can serve as regulative ideals or guiding principles for how we should direct reason. In other words, ideas are rules for uniting and forming all of our empirical concepts, but we cannot know if they apply to things in themselves, nor do they structure experience definitively the way that Space, Time, and the Categories do.

Reason (*Vernunft*) – Reason is the discursive faculty of inference. While the understanding allows us to form concepts and subsume objects under them in judgments, reason can make inferences from judgments. For instance, it can perform syllogisms. However, unlike sensibility and the understanding, reason lacks *a priori* forms of knowledge. It does give us *a priori* commands, but this is in its *practical* use. When we attempt to infer about things in themselves and thus go beyond experience, we fall into **transcendental illusion**.

Space (*Raum*) and **Time** (*Zeit*) – These are the *a priori* forms of sensibility or *a priori* intuitions. They are respectively the forms of outer and inner sense (although Kant extends time to outersense as well). Outer sense here means extrospection and inner sense means introspection. Space and Time allow the synthesis of the synthetic *a priori* truths of arithmetic and geometry. They are also the forms in which the **categories** get expressed (or are "schematized" with).

Categories – The categories are the twelve *a priori* concepts or forms of the understanding. They correspond to the twelve logical forms of judgments. The categories are necessary for the possibility of experience since they ensure that we meet with **objects**. The categories have "objective validity", meaning they are proven to be necessary since they are necessary for objects, and objects are necessary for experience. Specifically, they are necessary for the **unity of apperception**.

Transcendental Logic

Apperception – Apperception is self-consciousness, meaning one's knowledge of one's own identity. Knowing, in any given experience, that it is *you* who are having that experience, is apperception. The **Unity of Apperception** – is the synthesis whereby any representation you have is already made one of *your* representations, and that from moment to moment it is not some new consciousness, but one and the same consciousness having different experiences.

Transcendental Illusion – The mistake about making inferences about things-in-themselves, e.g. proofs of god's existence or the immortality of the soul. We have a natural tendency to overextend ourselves since reason is constantly seeking unity, but we must discipline ourselves not to believe that theoretical knowledge can extend beyond experience. However, we can and must make practical use of the ideas of reason, and it would be a **transcendental illusion** of dogmatic metaphysics to claim that the ideas of practical reason definitely do not exist in themselves.

Transcendental Argument – Not a term used by Kant, but a term frequently used to describe many of his arguments, especially the Argument from Geometry. In a transcendental argument,

one infers from the fact that we have a certain kind of knowledge that the conditions which are necessary to have such knowledge, the grounds, must exist. They can be expressed formally as: The key step in any transcendental argument is the proof that the grounds really are necessary for having such knowledge. Notice, we are inferring from something about consciousness to something about the world. This step is only licensed by a Primacy of Consciousness type of metaphysics where (a) mind can *make* reality thus-and-so.

Kant's Biography¹

1724	Kant is born on April 22 in Königsberg, Prussia
1730-32	Attends elementary school at Vorstäder Hospitalschule
1732-40	Attends the Pietist Collegium Fredericanum
1737	His mother, Anna Regina née Reuter, dies tending to the illness of a sick friend
1740-46	Attends the Albertina, (Königsberg's University); leaves without degree
1746	Death of Kant's father
1748-54	Works as a private tutor for families in Judtschen, Arnsdorf, and Rautenberg
1749	Publishes True Estimation of Living Forces
1754	Returns to Königsberg; Publishes "Whether the Earth Has Changed in it Revolutions" and "Whether the Earth is Aging from a Physical Point of View"
1755	Recieves M.A. for "On Fire" (<i>Meditationum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio</i>); Earns the right to lectures as <i>Privatdozent</i> with A New Exposition of the First Principles if Metaphysical Exposition; begins lecturing; publishes General Natural History of the Heavens
1756	Publishes doctoral dissertation on Physical Monadology; three essays on the
	Lisbon earthquake and an essay on the theory of winds
1757	Announces lectures on physical geography
1758	Publishes "New Doctrine of Motion and Rest"
1759	Publishes "Essay on Optimism"
1762	Publishes "The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures
1763	Publishes Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God and "Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy"
1764	Declines professorship of poetry; publishes <i>Observations on the Feeling of the</i> <i>Beautiful and Sublime</i> and the second-prize winning essay for the 1762 Berlin Academy competition, <i>Inquiry concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of</i> <i>Natural Theology and Morality</i> (Moses Mendelssohn wins first prize)
1766	Adds the position of sub-librarian at the castle and university library; publishes Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics (Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Aletaphysik)
1768	Publishes "Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space"
1769	Declines offer of professorship at Erlangen
1770	Declines offer from Jena; appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at
	Königsberg; defends and publishes inaugural dissertation On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World (De mundi sensibilis atque
1777	<i>intenigionis forma et principils)</i> ; Beginning of the "Stient Decade"
1//2	pure reason; begins anthropology lectures; gives up sub-librarian position
1775	Essay "On the Different Human Races" announces his anthropology lectures
1776	Essay on the educational philosophy of the Dessau Philanthropinum
1778	Declines professorship at Halle

¹ Chronology adapted from Paul Guyer's Kant (Routledge, 2006) and

Kant's Biography Continued

1781	Critique of Pure Reason published in May
1782	First, negative review of <i>Critique</i> published
1783	Responds in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics
1784	Essays on "The Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View?" and "What is Enlightenment?"
1785	Publishes <i>Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals</i> , review of Herder's <i>Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind</i> , and essays on "Volcanoes on the Moon", "The Wrongful Publication of Books", and "The Definition of the Concept of a Human Race"
1786	Publishes <i>Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science</i> , essays on "Conjectural Beginnings of the Human Race" and "What does Orientation in Thinking Mean?"; begins to serve as rector of the University; becomes external member of the Berlin Academy of the Sciences
1787	Second edition of <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>
1788	Publishes <i>Critique of Practical Reason</i> and "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy"
1790	Publishes <i>Critique of the Power of Judgment</i> and "One a discovery that is to make all new critique of pure reason dispensable because of an older one" (in response to the polemic of J.A. Eberhard)
1791	Publishes "On the Failure of All Attempts at a Theodicy"
1792	Publishes essay that will become Part I of the Religion
1793	Publishes the whole of <i>Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason</i> , essay "On the Old Saying: That may be correct in theory but it is of no use in practice"
1794	Prohibited from publishing further on religion; elected to the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg
1795	Publishes Toward Perpetual Peace
1796	Publishes "On the recently supercilious tone in philosophy"; gives final lecture on July 23
1797	Publishes <i>Metaphysics of Morals</i> and "On a presumed right to lie from philanthropic motives"
1796/7-1800/1	Works on the unfinished "Transition from the metaphysical principles of
	natural science to physics " (now known as the <i>Opus postumum</i> ; first published only in 1026.38, and even then out of sequence)
1798	Publishes <i>The Conflict of the Faculties</i> and <i>Anthropology from a Practical Point</i> of View
1799	August 7, Kant's open letter against Fichte's Doctrine of Science
1800	Publication of Kant's Logic, edited by B.G. Jäsche (from his lectures)
1802	Publication of Kant's <i>Physical Geography</i> , edited by F.T. Rink (from lectures)
1803	Publication of Kant's <i>Pedagogy</i> , edited by Rink (from lectures)
1804	Dies on February 12; publication of <i>What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in</i> <i>Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?</i> Edited by Rink

Intellectual Currents in Kant's Lifetime

David Hume and his German Reception

1711	April 26, Hume born in Edinburgh
1739	Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (3 vols) is published. Only 1000 copies are
	printed and its reception is poor
1748	Hume publishes An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
1751	Hume publishes An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
1753	Hume publishes Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (A four-volume
	collection of his works)
1756	Sulzer publishes German translation of Hume's <i>Essays and Treatises</i> , including
	the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
1771	Hamann publishes a German translation of the conclusion of Bk I of the Treatise
1772	Anonymous German translation of Beattie's attack on Hume, which contained quotations from the <i>Treatise</i>
1776	August 25, Hume dies
1778-9	Posthumous publication of Hume's <i>Dialogues concerning Natural Religion</i>
1790	Jakob publishes the first German translation of Hume's Treatise

Pantheism Controversy

1780	Alleged conversations between Lessing and Jacobi
1781	Death of Gotthold Lessing, February 15
1785	F.H. Jacobi's Letters concerning the Doctrines of Spinoza launches Pantheist
	Controversy
1786	Death of Moses Mendelssohn, January 4
1786	Kant rejects both sides in "What does Orientation in Thinking Mean?"
1786-87	K. L. Reinhold (1757-1823) publishes Letters on the Kantian Philosophy

Rise of German Idealism

Ideal	lism and Realism
0 1701 Point	
7, 1771 Kelli	hold publishes his <i>Essay towards a New Theory of the Faculty of</i>
Repr	esentation and then New Theory of Human Understanding; later Foundation
of Ph	nilosophical Knowledge (1791)
0 Salor	mon Maimon (1754-1800) publishes Investigation of the Transcendental
Philo	<i>osophy</i> (Kant had said that of all his critics, Maimon understood him best)
2 Schu	lze publishes Aenesidemus (skeptical critique of Kant and Reinhold)
4 Ficht	e publishes his "Review of Aenesidemus" and then the first three sections of
the fi	rst edition of his <i>Doctrine of Science</i> ; German Idealism is well under way.
9 Augu	ust 7, Kant's open letter against Fichte's Doctrine of Science
6-1801* Kant	's Opus Postumum contains the Selbstsetzunglehre – the Doctrine of
Self-	positing.
4 Ficht the fi 9 Augu 6-1801* Kant Self-	e publishes his "Review of <i>Aenesidemus</i> " and then the first three sections of irst edition of his <i>Doctrine of Science</i> ; German Idealism is well under way. 1st 7, Kant's open letter against Fichte's <i>Doctrine of Science</i> 's <i>Opus Postumum</i> contains the Selbstsetzunglehre – the Doctrine of positing.

Philosophical Timeline: The "Early-Modern Period" – Descartes to Kant



Select Bibliography

Primary Texts

There are many options for reading Kant in German, although the Akademie editions of his works are the scholarly standard

For translations, I recommend the following:

Critique of Pure Reason. trr. and edd. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

- The Guyer & Wood translation is the <u>definitive translation</u> of the *Critique* into English. (Norman Kemp-Smith's translation is serviceable, but it has been completely surpassed by the Cambridge volume.) Accept no substitute.

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. tr.ed. Gary Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

-Kant wrote the *Prolegomena* in 1783 as a more accessible introduction to the critical philosophy of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is easier to understand and quite shorter. If you find reading the *Critique* too daunting, then start with the *Prolegomena*. This particular edition of the *Prolegomena* can also be found in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781 (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation)* eds. Henry Allison and Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. However, that volume is only available in hardcover and is quite expensive.

Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science tr. and ed. Michael Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

-In this 1786 work Kant attempts to establish the foundations of physics from the categories and the supplemental (empirical) definition of "matter as the movable". It is extremely interesting, but also very challenging. Like the *Prolegomena* edition above, This translation can also be found in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781 (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation)* eds. Henry Allison and Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Critique of the Power of Judgment. Ed. Paul Guyer Tr. Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

- In Kant's third and final critique of 1790, he gives a unified account of aesthetics and teleology based on the power of judgment. He claims that judgment, through our experiences of the beautiful, the sublime, and the apparent purposiveness in nature, helps to bridge the gap between nature and freedom or the (theoretical) understanding and (practical) reason. This is far and away the best translation of this crucial work into English

Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. and Tr. Allen W. Wood. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

-There is another very good translation of this by Gregor in *Practical Philosophy* (below), but I find the Wood translation to be clearer.

Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation). Edd. Mary Gregor and Allan Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

-Contains all of Kant's most important works on moral philosophy (excluding the *Religion*,) including Gregor's translation of *The Critique of Practical Reason*.

Religion and Rational Theology. eds. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

- Contains the best translation of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* is by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni. It is available with a number of other important works in

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Select Bibliography Continued

Secondary Texts

Here, I focus on books about Kant's theoretical philosophy, especially the first Critique, and general works about him and his thought. In addition to these, I also recommend the *Cambridge Companion to Kant*, and the *Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*.

Biography

The standard biography for Kant is: *Kant: A Biography*. Manfred Keuhn. Cambridge: 2001.

General Introduction to Kant

In my opinion, the best general introduction to Kant is Paul Guyer's new book, *Kant*. (Routledge: 2006). Also good is Allen Wood's *Kant* (Blackwell: 2004)

Here are a few of the most relevant works on Kant's theoretical philosophy:

Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Paul Guyer. Cambridge: 1987.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism. (2nd Edition). Henry Allison. Yale University Press: 2004. -I do not personally agree with Allison's interpretation of Kant, but it is highly influential.

Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Beatrice Longuenesse. Princeton University Press: 2001.

Kant's Theory of Freedom. Henry Allison. Cambridge University Press: 1990.

Kant and the Exact Sciences. Michael Friedman. Harvard University Press: 1998 (reissue) - A kind of weird interpretation, but fascinating.

A Commentary on Kant's <u>Critique of Practical Reason</u>. Lewis White Beck. University of Chicago Press: 1996 (reprint edition)

-Lewis White Beck was one of the best Kant scholars of the 20th c. This work deals with Kant's 2nd Critique which is vital for understanding his theory of free will.

A Commentary to Kant's <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u>. (2nd Ed.) Norman Kemp-Smith. Macmillan: 2003. - This one is an oldie but a goody.

Although the following are not necessarily excellent exegeses of Kant (though Schopenhauer's is quite good), they represent some of the most interesting and influential philosophical engagements with the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

Letters on the Kantian Philosophy. K.L. Reinhold. Ed. Karl Ameriks. Tr. James Hebbeler. Cambridge University Press: 2006.

- These letters were the form in which most philosophers first became acquainted with Kantianism in the 1780's. This edition also has an excellent introduction about the Pantheism debate and Reinhold's philosophy.

Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism. Eds George di Giovanni & H.S.Harris - Some of the most interesting texts from the first generation of Kant's critics and followers.

The World as Will and Representation (vol 1). Arthur Schopenhauer. -The the first volume's appendix on Kant is just fascinating. One of the best things ever written about Kant.

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The Bounds of Sense. P.F. Strawson. London: Routledge, 1966. - A philosophical classic. One of the only greatly intelligent books to emerge from the Analytic tradition.

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